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Abstract
This study offers a method for empirically testing
theories operationalized in the form of multivariate
statistical models. An innovation of the method is that it
distinguishes testing into three separate forms, “effect
testing,” “prediction testing,” and “theory testing,”
where statistical significance plays a separate role in
each one. In another innovation, the researcher
specifies not only his or her desired level of statistical
significance, but also his or her desired level of
practical significance. Statistical significance and
practical significance each serve as a dimension in a
two-dimensional table that specifies the rejection region
– the region where the researcher can justify the
decision to reject the theory being tested. The boundary
of the rejection region is the “validity frontier,” which
ongoing research may advance so as to reduce the size
of the rejection region.

1. Introduction
What are the roles of statistical significance in theory
testing?
Consider the situation where a behavioral theory in
information
systems
(IS)
is
operationalized
mathematically as a set of one or more equations.
Typically, the left-hand side of an equation is a
dependent variable and the right-hand side is often a
linear combination of independent variables, but
nonlinear combinations are certainly allowed too. The
set of equations is then fitted to a population with a
sample of data taken from the population. Traditionally,
hypothesis testing is conducted to determine the level of
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of
the independent variables.
The purpose of this essay is to innovate two
additional roles for statistical significance in testing: In
addition to the role played by statistical significance in
the traditional hypothesis testing just described, we
propose a second role for statistical significance in
prediction testing (the testing of an individual prediction
made by the theory’s equations after they are fitted with
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sample data to a population) and a third role for
statistical significance in theory testing (the testing of
the theory through the multiple predictions it makes).
In the second and next section of this essay, we will
use a case from natural science to introduce some basic
ideas that we will subsequently refine with a behavioral
IS example. The reason for using a natural-science case
is that its subject matter, being physical and
unambiguous, is conducive to the introduction of more
abstract ideas without unnecessary complications.
This introductory case will allow us, in the third
section, to make a revealing examination of behavioralscience theorizing which involves statistical inference.
We will draw attention to how traditional statistical
hypothesis testing for the statistical significance of
estimated coefficients, while not incorrect, is
incomplete when it comes to the matter of theory
testing. We will show how to conduct statistical
behavioral research so as to carry out, to completion, the
required scientific method of testing. Then, in the fourth
section, we will introduce a new methodological
concept, a theory’s “validity frontier,” which is a visual
way of summarizing how well a behavioral theory does,
or does not, predict and therefore is, or is not, valid. It
accounts for a researcher’s own preferences for how
inaccurate a theory’s predictions may be until the
researcher himself or herself feels compelled to consider
the theory to fail.

2. A natural-science example: an
illustration of the use of statistical
inference in theorizing
For an illustration of the use of statistical inference
in natural science, we turn to an example of an object
falling in a liquid for which 19 data points are collected,
where each data point denotes the object’s velocity V
(measured in meters/second or m/s) as the independent
variable and the object’s force F (measured in Newtons
or N) as the dependent variable.
The source of the material in Figure 1 is [14]. The
original data for the 19 data points (the measured values)
and the two graphs are taken from the downloaded
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Figure 1
documents. The “Prediction Error” columns have been
added.
As the left-hand side of Figure 1 indicates for the 19
data points, a simple regression explains the force F of
the falling object as a linear function of the object’s
velocity, “F = -0.4612V + 5.6518,” where the
explanation is excellent statistically. The p-value for the
estimated coefficient -0.4612 is almost as small as 0
(which would ideally be its best value) and the R2 value
is 0.9698 (where ideally its best value would be 1). In
behavioral research, numerical values for the p-value
and the R2 are rarely, if ever, as good as these, which
would be regarded as excellent support for the
theoretical explanation being tested.
However, as the right-hand side of Figure 1
indicates, the very same 19 data points also allow a
different regression to explain the same force F of the
falling object as a nonlinear (quadratic) function of the

object’s velocity, “F = -0.0271V2 -0.1278V + 4.977,”
where the explanation is even better than the prior one.
The p-value for the estimated coefficient -0.0271 and
the p-value for the other estimated coefficient -0.1278
are both excellent (each is almost as small as 0) and the
value for the R2, as 0.9986, is even closer to 1 than the
R2 for the linear equation.
Scientifically, the bottom-line criterion is not so
much one or another statistical measure, but a predictive
measure: Which theoretical explanation is more
predictive? In Figure 1, there are two “Prediction Error”
columns; the column for the linear explanation, “F = 0.4612V + 5.6518,” shows prediction errors that are
consistently greater than the prediction errors in the
same rows in the column for the other explanation, “F =
-0.0271V2 -0.1278V + 4.977.” The better predictive
power is sufficient to reject the former explanation in
favor of the latter one.
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Four additional points are worth noting. The first one
is that statistical measures (such as the R2 value, and the
estimated coefficient’s p-value or level of statistical
significance) are indeed helpful to show how well a
general equation (such as “F = ß0 + ß1V” or “F = ß0 +
ß1V + ß2V2”), when applied to a set of data sampled
from a population, fits the population; however, in
general, statistical measures and statistical inference
play an ancillary role (or, at best, a supporting role) in
science. In our example, how well or poorly an equation
statistically fits the population is a matter that precedes,
and is different from, how well the equation predicts.
Individual predictions must still be made from the
equation, and then empirically tested to see if each one
succeeds or fails. Thus, empirically testing a theory
through its predictions follows, and is not pre-empted or
supplanted by, any statistical tasks of fitting the theory’s
equation(s) to a population. Historically speaking,
statistical inference is just one possible, but not
necessary, research tool available to scientific research.
Consider that Neyman and Egon Pearson introduced the
idea of a confidence interval only in 1928 and the
procedure for hypothesis testing only in 1933 [1]. If
research must be statistical to be scientific, then this
would mean that there was no science before 1928.
Also, statistical hypothesis testing of the estimated
coefficient of an independent variable (e.g., “H0: ß1 = 0”
regarding “F = ß0 + ß1V + ß2V2”) is not to be confused
with the empirical testing that compares predicted
values with observed values (e.g., comparing a value
predicted for F with the value observed for F after “F =
ß0 + ß1V + ß2V2” has been fitted to the population where
the empirical testing is being conducted).
The second additional point worth noting is that
even an incorrect theory can have excellent statistical
measurements. As even a first-year university physics
student knows, the linear equation “F = -0.4612V +
5.6518” (or actually, regarding our example of the
object falling in a liquid, any linear equation) is
scientifically incorrect, despite its having an excellent pvalue for an estimated coefficient and an excellent R2
value. And if this is the case in natural science, then
what does this portend for the case in social science,
where typically p-values and R2 values are hardly ever
as good as they are even in the incorrect natural science
case of “F = -0.4612V + 5.6518”? The lesson is that,
because excellent statistical results – e.g., even an
astonishing R2 of 0.9698 and even estimated coefficients
with high statistical significance – can still be consistent
with an incorrect theory, the scientific status of a theory
as true (or, at least, as not rejected) does not follow from
the quality of its statistical fit (assuming that statistical
inference is used at all), but from the empirical testing
of the predictions made from it.

The third point is that, in our example of the object
falling in a liquid, we can conduct a test of either theory
(one theory being that force and velocity are related to
each other by the relation “F = ß0 + ß1V” and the other
theory being that the relation is instead “F = ß0 + ß1V +
ß2V2) by noting how many of its predictions can be
regarded to succeed or fail. Of course, this would
involve establishing a threshold level for how great a
prediction error may be before the prediction is judged
to fail, as well as establishing another threshold level for
how many predictions may fail before the theory itself
is also judged to fail. Both thresholds, we will explain
in detail below, involve a role for statistical significance
– but they are roles different from the one associated
with the traditional testing of the null hypothesis
pertaining to an estimated coefficient, e.g., “H0: ß1 = 0.”
The fourth point is that, in the literature of
behavioral IS articles, numerous studies conducted by
prominent researchers and published in prominent
journals demonstrate the practice of engaging in
traditional statistical hypothesis testing with regard to
estimated coefficients, but these studies never proceed
to the subsequent, necessary scientific step of
empirically testing a theory by computing any values it
predicts for a dependent variable and then comparing
them to values observed for the dependent variable.
Such studies include [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9],
[10], [11]. All of these studies mention “prediction,”
“predictor,” “predicting,” or “predict,” but not one of
them describes or reports the actual test of any
prediction. The journals in which these studies appear
include all eight of the “Senior Scholars’ Basket of
Journals.” The statistical method in these studies is not
incorrect, but is incomplete in so far as the theories
being advanced were not empirically tested. In the next
section, we propose a remedy for this situation.

3. In behavioral IS research: a remedy for
making the use of statistical inference
complete for theory testing
Testing a theory, where the researcher has used a
sample of data from a population to fit the theory to the
population, is not as simple as using the fitted theory to
make and test just a single prediction. The main reason
for this is that sampling error, introduced whenever a
sample of data is taken from a population, can induce
inaccuracies in the fitted equation’s coefficients. For
instance, in an example from Figure 1, the coefficient 0.1278 in “F = -0.0271V2 -0.1278V + 4.977” could be
different from what the true value of it is. (In statistical
parlance, the equivalent statement would be that the
estimated value ß̂ 2 is different from the true, but known,
value ß2, where the predicted value of F should ideally

5739

be computed using ß2, not ß̂ 2.) This, in turn, creates the
complication that the result of testing a predicted value
of F could then be disputed because the predicted value
of F is itself inaccurate, whether the result is “the
prediction succeeds” or “the prediction fails.”
The remedy to this problem involves two actions.
One is to make the decision that a prediction fails only
if the difference between the predicted value and the
observed value reaches a given threshold level, where
this threshold level is to be determined. The second
action is to make the decision that the theory fails not if
just one prediction fails, but only if the number of
predictions that fail, out of the total number of
predictions that are tested, also reaches a given threshold
level, where this threshold level is also to be determined.
How are the two threshold levels to be determined?

3.1. Determining the threshold level for where a
prediction fails
One approach to determining the threshold level for
where a prediction fails is for the researcher to rely on
his or her own judgment in a reasoned, and replicable,
manner. The use of a critical level of statistical
significance, such as “reject H0 where α = .05,”
establishes the precedent allowing this to be done. Just
as a researcher is allowed to determine the threshold
level of statistical significance in hypothesis testing to
be a numerical value that the researcher chooses for α
(the threshold level beyond which the measured p-value
allows the researcher to make the decision to reject H0),
we regard a researcher as no less allowed to determine
the threshold level of prediction error beyond which the
observed or measured prediction error allows the
researcher to make the decision that the prediction fails.
Just as the threshold level in statistical hypothesis
testing is denoted with the symbol α, we choose to
denote as the threshold level in prediction testing with
the symbol π. And just as a researcher can conduct
“what if” analyses with different values of α, showing
how sensitive or insensitive the conclusion (i.e., “reject
the null hypothesis”) is to different values of α, the
researcher can also conduct “what if” analyses with
different values of π, showing how sensitive or
insensitive the conclusion (e.g., “the prediction fails”) is
to different values of π.
We choose, furthermore, to take advantage of a
particular circumstance in behavioral information
systems research. It is that many or most variables are
measured on a Likert scale, typically from 1 to 7.
Suppose that a dependent variable (such as “the
individual’s behavioral intention to use the given
technology”) is measured on a scale from 1 to 7, that a
numerical value is predicted for the dependent variable,

and that the resulting prediction error turns out to be just
±0.1 unit (on the same scale from 1 to 7). On the one
hand, a researcher may consider this prediction error to
be so small as to lack practical significance; the
researcher considers it to be insufficient to judge the
prediction to fail and instead writes it off as an artifact
of sampling error. On the other hand, if ±0.1 unit on a
scale from 1 to 7 is too small to bear any practical
significance, then how large must a prediction error be
to provide sufficient confidence to a researcher to make
the decision that the prediction has failed? Consider
prediction errors that cross the threshold of ±1.0 unit.
Such a threshold would be particularly generous,
considering that it spans a range of 2 units and therefore
covers 33% of the entire scale.
Analogously to statistical hypothesis testing, just as
a researcher may choose his or her desired level of
“statistical significance,” α, to be a particular numerical
value such as .05, a researcher may also choose what we
are now naming his or her desired level of “practical
significance,” π, as being ±1.0 unit for the given variable
operationalized on a Likert scale from 1 to 7. And just
as it would behoove the researcher to see if his or her
conclusions change or are insensitive to changes in the
value chosen for α, it would behoove the researcher to
see if his or her conclusions change or are insensitive to
changes in the value chosen for π. The larger the range
of values across which the conclusion remains
unchanged, the more durable or objective the conclusion
would be; just as this has always been the case regarding
the range of values for α, this is also the case regarding
the range of values for π.
An additional necessary consideration is the
probability, in decision making, of a false positive. In
statistical hypothesis testing, it is the probability, where
the null hypothesis H0 actually happens to be true, that
the researcher makes the decision to reject it. In fact,
this is the definition of, and is denoted as, the
aforementioned α. It is the probability of making the
decision that the independent variable, whose estimated
coefficient’s statistical significance is being measured,
is indeed related to the dependent variable when, in
actuality, it is not (hence, “false positive”).
Analogously, in prediction testing, it is the probability
of making the decision that there exists a difference
between the predicted value and the observed or
measured value (apart from the “noise” of samplinginduced inaccuracy in computing the prediction) when,
in actuality, there is no such difference. Unfortunately,
to denote the latter probability, the symbol α is already
taken. Therefore, to denote the two probabilities, we
will distinguish them as αet and αpt. For the former, αet,
the subscript “et” refers to effect testing, insofar as
statistical hypothesis testing with regard to the null
hypothesis “H0: ßi = 0” is about whether or not the
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coefficient ßi of the independent variable in a
multivariate analysis indeed indicates an effect on the
dependent variable. (Our usage of the term “effect” here
is consistent with the term “effect size.”) For the latter,
αpt, the subscript “pt” refers to prediction testing. By
convention, the maximum acceptable probability or
threshold level for making the decision error of a false
positive is 0.05.
What this means is that, in the test of a prediction
made by the theory (which is that there is no difference
between the predicted value and the observed or
measured value, apart from the “noise” of samplinginduced inaccuracy in computing the prediction), the
researcher is willing to accept up to a 5% probability
that he or she would be incorrectly deciding, whenever
the prediction error exceeds the numerical value that he
or she earlier established for π (such as ±1.0), that the
difference exists – i.e., that the prediction fails and
therefore contradicts the theory.

3.2. Determining the threshold level for where a
theory fails
As mentioned, the reason why a single prediction is
not sufficient to test the theory making the prediction is
that sampling error induces “noise” in the computation
of the value that is predicted. Suppose, then, 100
predictions are tested instead of just 1. If 90 of the 100
fail, the researcher could be confident in rejecting the
theory making the predictions. But suppose just 10 of
the 100 predictions fail. In this case, would the
researcher have sufficient confidence to reject the
theory? After all, some of the predictions deemed to fail
could be false positives. The binomial distribution
provides a formula by which to compute the probability
that, out of n trials, x of them will be successes (as well
as, therefore, the probability that x or more of them will
be successes), where the probability of success in a
given trial is p. In our application of the binomial
formula, (1) a false positive is defined as a “success,”
which is the occurrence of a prediction that is deemed to
fail because its prediction error exceeds π, when in fact
the prediction is successful, (2) n = 100, (3) x = 10, and
(4) the researcher chooses 0.05 as the value for the
probability p (which in this application of the binomial
is also the probability of a false positive αpt). Thus the
probability of making the decision that 10 or more of the
100 predictions fail, when in fact the predictions are
true, can be computed from the cumulative binomial
formula as only 0.028, or 2.8%.
Because this
probability fits the definition of a p-value, this implies
that the theory can be rejected at a critical significance
level of 0.05; we designate this latest critical
significance level as αtt, where the subscript “tt” refers

to theory testing. Like αet and αpt, we note αtt is the
probability of a false positive – here, the probability of
making the decision that the independent and dependent
variables in the theory are related to each other as the
theorized equation specifies, when they are in fact not
so related – where convention regarding false positives
dictates that this threshold level not be greater than 0.05.
Because the p-value of 0.028 crosses the threshold
level of αtt as 0.05, the researcher may properly reject
the theory as true. Equivalently, the researcher may
reject, at the 97.2% level of confidence, the statement
that the theory is true when the researcher judges 10 of
the predictions to fail, where a failed prediction is one
where the prediction error exceeds the threshold of the
numerical value that the researcher earlier assigned to π
(such as ±1.0).
To recapitulate our discussion from the beginning of
the essay, we have formulated a research method by
which not only (1) a theory, operationalized in the form
of an equation, is statistically fitted to a population with
data sampled from the population in a process that
makes use of statistical significance in the traditional
form which we denote as αet, but also (2) the same theory
is then empirically tested through the predictions it
makes, making use of statistical significance in our
newly innovated forms of αpt and αtt. As noted earlier,
numerous behavioral studies in information systems,
conducted by prominent researchers and published in
prominent journals, demonstrate the practice of
engaging in traditional statistical hypothesis testing with
regard to estimated coefficients (i.e., the phrase just
designated as “(1)”), but these studies never proceed to
the subsequent, necessary scientific step of empirically
testing a theory by computing any values it predicts for
a dependent variable and then comparing them to values
observed for the dependent variable (i.e., the phrase just
designated as “(2)”). In this study, we are contributing
“(2).”

4. An application of the three roles of
statistical significance and a theory’s
validity frontier
We were fortunate enough for Lee and Hubona [12]
to grant us access to the same data set that they used in
Appendix C of their article, given the potential for our
research method to complement the one that their
Appendix describes. They state (p. 262):
For purposes other than those in this study, the
second author collected data from a project
financed by the Saudi Arabian government to
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Figure 2
assess factors that affect the acceptance and use
of computers (as a technology) by knowledge
workers in Saudi Arabia. The participating
organizations represented various banking,
merchandising, manufacturing, and petroleum
industries. The survey solicited responses from
professional knowledge workers in these
organizations engaged in the use of desk top
computers for the purpose of their work.
Through this procedure, a total of 1,190 survey
responses were collected. The survey collected
data on three of the technology acceptance
model’s constructs. ...
We used Lee et al.’s data, sampled from a
population, to fit an equation of the technology

acceptance model or TAM (Davis et al., 1989) to the
same population. The equation is “IU = ß0 + ß1 PU + ß2
PEOU.” IU is a person’s behavioral intention to use the
given technology, PU is the persons’ perceived
usefulness for the technology, PEOU is the person’s
perceived ease of use for the technology, and each ßi is
a constant whose true value is unknown but is estimated
through statistical inference. Each variable is measured
on a scale from 1 to 7.
To explain the meaning of Figure 2, where we
embed the use of the “validation set approach to cross
validation” [13], we focus on one cell in the table, where
π = ±1.1 and αpt = 5% or 0.05. In this cell, the numerical
values of the constants ßi are estimated with PLS SEM,
using just 1,090 of the total of 1,190 data points in the
sample. We then use each one of the remaining 100 data
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Figure 3
points along with the fitted equation to predict a value
for the dependent variable IU, which we then compare
to the measured or observed value of IU. If the
difference between the two values is greater than π =
±1.1 (i.e., if the absolute value of the difference exceeds
1.1), then we make the decision that the prediction fails.
The table indicates that 11 of the 100 predictions fail.
Then, using the binomial formula as explained above,
the p-value can be computed; it is 0.0115. Where αtt =
0.05, this p-value justifies the decision to reject the
theory as true. This cell is shaded red to indicate the
rejection. Each cell represents a different pair of values
for of π and αpt.

Worthy of attention is that there are only two cells
where the theory TAM escapes rejection; they are in the
column where π is ±1.2. This means that a researcher
who wishes to advocate TAM would have to tolerate an
unrealistically large “leeway” or “margin of error” to
explain away the large prediction error as the result of
sampling error. In other words, only by adopting a
maximum tolerable prediction error π as generous as
±1.2, which spans 40% of the dependent variable’s
entire scale from 1 to 7, may the researcher avoid
rejecting the theory TAM as true.
And if one desires to use maximum tolerable
prediction errors that are more reasonable or more
modest (i.e., as in the first six columns in the table), then
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Figure 4
the results are unanimous to reject the theory TAM as
true. The major point here is not the rejection of TAM,
but the finding that the same conclusion is reached
across numerous “what if scenarios.” In general, the
finding of insensitivity in a sensitivity analysis is a
finding of durability or objectivity in the conclusion that
was reached.
Despite the dramatic finding, based on the Lee et al.
data set, to reject TAM, we do not necessarily vouch for
the quality or the validity of the data set. To address this
problem, we use two simulated data sets in order to
crosscheck our investigation. The reason is that using a
simulated data set allows us to control measurement
errors and other potential sources of errors that one

would inevitably face in any type of empirical study.
We report, in an unpublished working paper, the results
of using the two simulated data sets. We share the
results as follows.
We simulated data mostly using functions from the
SIMSEM package in R. The simulated data sets exhibit
excellent properties of multivariate normality with
regard to skewness, kurtosis, heteroscedasticity, and
measurement. The size of each simulated data set is
1,000. We applied the validation set approach to cross
validation to each one, where the training set has 900
data points and the validation set has 100 data points.
The R2 was 25% in scenario A (using one simulated data
set), and 48% in scenario B (using the other simulated
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data set). (Note that the r-square was 35% for our
original field data set.) The estimates of the coefficients
ßi were all statistically significant (at p < 0.001) in
scenarios A and B, as they were in our original field data
set. The red-shaded rejection region for scenarios A and
B (see Figure 3) are altogether comparable with the
rejection region we came up with using the original data
set – a finding consistent with the presence of errors in
the theory, TAM, rather than the presence of problems
in the data. Another point worthy of mention is that the
rejection region counterintuitively expands even though
the R2 increases when moving from scenario A to the
original field data and eventually to scenario B – a
finding potentially consistent with the idea that our
research method does not produce a replication of R2,
which is an in-sample measure; rather, it is concerned
with how well a theory performs when dealing with outof-sample data points.
Finally, we offer, in Figure 4, two completely
fictitious scenarios, C and D. Notice how the profiles of
the red-shaded rejection regions are slimmer and also
much closer to the table’s “northwest” corner. What we
are calling the “validity frontier” is essentially the
eastern “border” of the red-shaded region. In our view,
the goal of theorizing using statistical inference is not
so much to “prove” that the theory being tested is true
in a one-off study. To the contrary, the goal is, first, to
establish what the red-shaded rejection and hence, the
validity frontier are in the first place, so that ongoing
investigations can improve the theory (e.g., by adding,
removing, or replacing variables and relationships, and
even entire equations) as would become evident in the
validity frontier moving further northwest compared to
its location in the previous study. Therefore, in addition
to making the contribution of innovating statistical
research methods for prediction testing and theory
testing (not just hypothesis testing), we are also
contributing a conception of theorizing where the
objective is not to somehow “prove” the existence of an
immutable scientific law, but rather, to craft a theory
over time in an extended, multi-study research program
so that, as a human-made artifact, the theory can become
more and more useful in making accurate, and therefore
useful, predictions.

5. Conclusion
A simple and straightforward idea motivates this
research. The idea is that science requires a theory to be
empirically tested and to survive the empirical testing.
A theory that does not survive empirical testing, much
less one that has never been empirically tested in the
first place, may not be considered scientific. This idea
can be obscured by the extremely detailed and

sophisticated, but nonetheless necessary and helpful,
statistical procedures that have been regularly used in
behavioral IS research. The remedy that this paper has
advanced consists of additional statistical procedures
with which to restore the empirical testing of theories
back to its rightful place in the repertoire of required
scientific research methods.
This paper makes three contributions.
First, this paper’s differentiation of empirical testing
into three different and distinct procedures, each
involving its own role for statistical significance, not
only gives due recognition to the continued importance
of traditional hypothesis testing (which this paper names
as effect testing), but also gives names to additional
statistical procedures that also need to be carried out
(prediction testing and theory testing) before a
researcher can claim that his or her theory,
operationalized as a multivariate statistical model, is
scientific. Thus, a researcher who completes what he
knows as just the first of these procedures would not
mistakenly believe that he has completed all work
required in conducting the empirical test of a theory.
Henceforth, authors of research submissions to journals
and conferences, along with reviewers, editors, and
conference program chairs, may evaluate a theory,
operationalized as a multivariate statistical model, as
scientific only if it has also additionally undergone the
procedures of prediction testing and theory testing.
This paper’s second contribution is a twodimensional table useful for allowing a researcher to
examine numerous “what if” scenarios in the empirical
testing of a theory that is operationalized as a
multivariate statistical model. In this table, each cell is
a “what if” scenario reflecting two of the researcher’s
judgments: (1) the judgment for his or her choice of αpt
(the maximum tolerable probability, in prediction
testing, for making the decision that there exists a
difference between the predicted value and the observed
or measured value [apart from the “noise” of samplinginduced inaccuracy in computing the prediction] when,
in actuality, there is no such difference) and (2) the
judgment for her choice of π (which is the researcher’s
maximum tolerable prediction error, reflecting her
judgment of the point at which the prediction error
begins to bear sufficient practical significance so as to
indicate that the prediction fails). The results can be a
large number of “what if” scenarios, where the
researcher can see the extent to which a conclusion that
the theory is refuted (as reflected in table cells where the
p-value<αtt, where αtt=0.05) is sensitive, or insensitive,
to changes she can make in these two judgments. Such
insensitivity would bolster the objectivity of the finding
that the theory is refuted, where a larger rejection region
indicates greater insensitivity.
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This paper’s third contribution is the concept of a
theory’s validity frontier, and the associated idea that a
theory is better regarded as a human-made artifact to be
crafted and improved over time than as an immutable
scientific law to be discovered and proved in one piece.
Together, the three contributions amount to a
statistical method that uses not only statistical
significance, but also practical significance to test
theories. As discussed, this paper has demonstrated the
method’s viability and utility, but the generalizability of
the method can be established only through ongoing
research.

Controlled Screening Systems for Detecting Information
Purposely Concealed by Individuals,” Journal of Management
Information Systems (31:3), pp. 106-137.
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